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PRACTITIONERS' NOTES
LEFT IN THE DARK:
HOW NEW YORK'S TAYLOR LAW IMPAIRS
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Jason A. Zwara*
INTRODUCTION

Shortcomings in Public Sector Collective Bargaining
In New York, as in many states across the country, public sector
collective bargaining rights were introduced as the keystone to
combating public sector labor strife.' In giving public employees a valid
avenue to make their demands heard, the frustration that led to strikes
and work stoppages could, in theory, be diffused. While that theory,
adopted in New York through the Taylor Law of 1967, has been a
contributing factor in the extended period of labor tranquility over the
last thirty years, the relentless focus on preventing labor strikes has led
to an unstable and unsustainable economic model in public sector labor. 2
* Jason Zwara is the Executive Director of Buffalo ReformEd, a non-profit education advocacy
organization in Buffalo, New York. Juris Doctor, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2011;
Bachelor of Arts, Canisius College, 2008.
1. Only three-quarters of the states permit collective bargaining over wages and conditions
of employment by some or all public employees. In recent years, several states (including
Wisconsin, Indiana and Michigan) have enacted laws limiting or outright repealing collective
bargaining rights. See Steven Greenhouse, A Watershed Moment for Public-Sector Unions, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/19/us/19union.html.
2. See E.J. MCMAHON & TERRY O'NEIL, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, How
AN OBSCURE STATE LAW GUARANTEES PAY HIKES FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES - AND RAISES
THE TAX
TOLL ON NEW YORKERS
2 (2012)
http://www.empirecenter.org/Special-
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As initially imagined, the Taylor Law was meant to promote
flexibility and collaboration in labor relations. 3 Over its history,
however, the goal of preventing labor strife has dominated, resulting in a
system that preserves the rights and benefits employees enjoy first and
foremost at the expense of other interests of the public. This is
especially perpetuated by one particular clause of the Taylor Law,
known as the Triborough Amendment.4 As a result, public employers
must make major concessions to public employees to introduce any new
policies or practices.5
More often than not, employers have
accomplished this goal by negotiating contracts that kick costs and tough
decisions down the road. In difficult fiscal times, such as the financial
crisis of the early 2010s, these deferred costs start to burden public
employers.6 As such, it is vital that we explore and understand how the
collective bargaining structure established by the Taylor Law contributes
to the budget dilemmas facing school boards across the state.
This article proceeds by exploring the history and purpose of the
Taylor Law in Part I and the development of the Triborough
Amendment in Part II. Part III discusses how the Taylor Law works to
ensure labor harmony first and foremost, and how this has created a
dramatic imbalance in bargaining leverage between public unions and
school boards. Part IV discusses the budget woes facing the Buffalo
public schools as an example of how prior contract negotiations have
backed the current board into a financial corner. Finally, Part V explores
how the Taylor Law interferes with collective bargaining and makes
legislative recommendations that can begin to level the playing field in
collective bargaining going forward.
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE TAYLOR LAW

A. Public Employee Relations in New York Before the Taylor Law
In 1947, New York enacted the Condon-Wadlin Act, its first law
regulating the relationship between public employers and employees.!
Reports/2012/01/triboroughtroubleO1112.cfm (comparison evidence shows that both the public
and private sectors have experienced lengthy periods of labor tranquility, suggesting broader
factors).
3. See RONALD DONOVAN,
RELATIONS IN NEW YORK 40 (1990).

4.
5.
6.
7.

ADMINISTERING THE TAYLOR LAW: PUBLIC EMPLOYEE

See MCMAHON & O'NEIL, supra note 2, at 1.
See id.
See id at 10.
Kristin Guild, New York State Taylor Law: Negotiating to Avoid Strikes in the Public
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Also during 1947, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, which
amended the nation's first major labor relations law.' Both the CondonWadlin and Taft-Hartley Acts were products of a common political and
economic climate. Following World War II, labor unrest became a
serious concern across many industries, including the public sector. 9 In
New York, "the proximate event that led to the enactment of [the]
Condon-Wadlin law in March 1947 was a week-long strike by twentyfour hundred school teachers in Buffalo."' 0 Condon-Wadlin was a direct
reaction to this example of labor strife, formally ratifying the common
law prohibition of strikes by public sector employees and enforcing this
prohibition with severe penalties." In reality, then, Condon-Wadlin was
less about regulating public sector employee relations than formally
preserving the existing relationship.
The law "was simple and
straightforward in its purpose: to prevent strikes of public employees by
making the cost of striking prohibitive." 1 2 Under the law, employees
that went on strike were to be immediately terminated; those later
reinstated would not be eligible for pay increases for three years and
would be placed on probation for a period of three to five years.
Despite the harsh penalties imposed on striking employees under
Condon-Wadlin, labor strife continued and actually worsened: from
1947 to 1964, there were twenty-one significant public labor strikes
across New York State. 14 Labor strife continued because the harsh
penalties in Condon-Wadlin were practically unenforceable. After a
public strike ended, neither side in the dispute wanted to resume labor
relations with the cloud of the harsh penalties overhead, so public
employers regularly waived the penalties. In 1963, the legislature tried
to address this issue by amending the law's penalties." The amendment
made little difference as 1965 saw a significant strike by Department of
Sector,
CORNELL
UNIV.,
RESTRUCTURING
LOCAL
GOV'T,
(May
1998),
http://www.mildredwarner.org/gov-restructuring/special-projects/nys-civil-service.
8. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (2006)).
9. See Guild, supranote 7.
10. DONOVAN, supra note 3, at 3.
11. John M. Crotty, An Introduction to the Taylor Law, N.Y. STATE DEPUTIES ASSOC., INC.
(Sept. 2001), http://www.nysdeputy.org/Archives,%20Wage%2OComparisons/Taylot/o20Law%20
Overview.pdf.
12. DONOVAN, supra note 3, at 5.
13. Crotty, supra note 11.
14. See Guild, supra note 7.
15. The 1963 amendments reduced the periods of probation and ineligibility for pay increases
on reinstated employees, however, they also added a penalty that all striking employees be fined
two days' pay for each day on strike. See Crotty, supranote 11.
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Welfare workers; the 1963 amendment expired shortly thereafter. 16
After the expiration of the Condon-Wadlin amendment, Democrats
in the legislature argued that a complete revision of the law was
necessary.' 7 In 1965, the Democrat-led legislature passed the LentolRossetti bill which would dramatically alter the government's approach
to public employee relations." Instead of attempting to prevent public
labor strikes through harsh penalties, Lentol-Rossetti would diffuse labor
Governor Rockefeller, a
unrest through collective bargaining.' 9
Republican, vetoed the bill, leaving Condon-Wadlin in place.20
It did not take long for a major event to change Rockefeller's mind.
Just as the Buffalo teachers' strike of 1947 spurred Condon-Wadlin, an
even larger strike in New York City forced the Governor to reconsider
the law.2' On New Year's Day, 1966, a New York City transit workers'
strike essentially shut down the city for twelve days, costing the city's
economy $100 million a day.22 When the strike was finally settled, the
inherent weakness of Condon-Wadlin was on display: as part of the deal
struck to end the strike, the state legislature passed an amnesty bill
foregoing all penalties that would otherwise have been imposed.23 Three
days after the strike ended, Governor Rockefeller announced that he
would appoint a Public Employee Relations Committee to "make
legislative proposals for protecting the public against the disruption of
vital public services by illegal strikes, while at the same time protecting
the rights of public employees." 24
B. The Taylor Commission
The committee Rockefeller put together was chaired by George W.
Taylor, professor of industry at the University of Pennsylvania, and
staffed with private sector labor experts from across the country; the
committee quickly took on the name of its chair, becoming known as the
Taylor Commission.25 From the start, the committee knew that CondonWadlin needed to be repealed and completely replaced with a
16.

DONOVAN, supranote 3, at 12.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See Crotty, supra note 11.
See DONOVAN, supra note 3, at 12.
See id.
See id. at 13.
See Guild, supra note 7.
See id
See id
Id; see DONOVAN, supra note 3, at 23.
Guild, supranote 7.
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comprehensive public sector collective bargaining system. 26 The
experience under Condon-Wadlin made it clear that simply outlawing
public employee strikes was not an effective practice. Rather, the best
approach to ensuring labor tranquility was to give public employees a
voice in setting the terms and conditions of employment.27 Though the
committee was well versed in private sector labor practices, it was
keenly aware that the unique characteristics of public sector labor
required unique solutions.2 8
In constructing a collective bargaining system, the committee
focused on five primary issues. Ronald Donovan, in his comprehensive
history of the Taylor Law, paraphrased the five questions the committee
posed to itself:
1. What forms of representation best serve the public interest and the
interest of employees?
2. What arrangements should be followed to resolve problems that may
arise concerning questions of employee representation?
3. What procedures should be developed for facilitating the process of
agreement?
4. In the event of deadlock, what additional procedures should be
available?
5. What should be the penalties for striking, and how should they be
administered? 29
Notably absent among these questions was whether the prohibition
on public employee strikes should continue; the committee almost took
it for granted that the prohibition would remain, though a minor question
over what penalties were appropriate would later be discussed.30
While the Taylor Commission looked at private sector collective
bargaining schemes as models, it also recognized that a public sector
scheme needed to account for the unique characteristics of public sector
26.. See DONOVAN, supra note 3, at 30.
27. See id. at 35 ("[T]he best way to protect the public from strikes was to fashion methods
whereby public employees could participate in affecting their terms and conditions of
employment .....").
28. See id. at 35-36.
29. Id. at 28-29.
30. See id. at 29.
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labor relations.3 1 In particular, the Commission needed to address three
realities. First, that "terms and conditions of [public] employment are
decided through a process responsive to majority will." 32 Second, that
"legal and practical restrictions [exist] on the authority of government
agencies to negotiate with their employees."33 Finally, that public
employees are prohibited from striking.34 Simply transposing a private
sector collective bargaining model onto the public sector would be
ineffective.
In the end, the Taylor Commission report, issued March 31, 1966,
recommended completely repealing Condon-Wadlin and replacing it
with a statute which would:
(a) grant to public employees the right of organization and
representation, (b) empower the state, local governments and other
political subdivisions to recognize, negotiate with and enter into
written agreements with employee organizations representing public
employees, (c) create a Public Employment Relations Board to assist

in resolving disputes between public employees and public employers,
and (d) continue the prohibition against strikes by public employees
and provide remedies for violations of such prohibition.
Two recommendations would specifically address the issues unique
to public sector labor relations: the creation of a largely independent
Public Employee Relations Board (PERB) and final legislative oversight
of impasse resolutions. The latter, a mechanism for reaching a firm,
binding resolution when disputes arose during contract negotiations, was
particularly important to the Commission.38 The report convincingly
argued that because labor contracts are so fundamental to the budgeting
process, and contract negotiations involve the allocation of public
resources, the respective legislative body must have final say.39
31. See Vincent Martin Bonventre, The Duty of Fair Representation Under the Taylor Law:
Supreme Court Development, New York State Adoption, and a Callfor Independence, 20 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1,6 -7 (1992).
32. Id. at 6 (quoting Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political
Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156, 1160 (1974)).
33. Bonventure, supra note 31, at 6.
34. Id. at 7.
35. Id.
36. Id at 5-6 (quoting DONOVAN, supra note 3, at 23).
37. See DONOVAN, supranote 3, at 38-39.
38. See id ("The committee's fundamental philosophical commitment to the principle of
legislative supremacy is manifest in its recommendations on impasse resolution. It is a constant
theme throughout the report.").
39. See id
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C. Enactingand Implementing the Taylor Law
Governor Rockefeller utilized much of the Taylor Commission
report in drafting the law to propose to the legislature. 4 0 The Governor's
proposed law, in fact, only deviated from the report in one major respect:
Governor Rockefeller was predictably unconvinced of the necessity for
legislative finality, instead retaining final authority to settle negotiation
disputes in the executive branch.4 1 With a divided legislature, the two
houses went different ways on the proposed law. The Republicancontrolled Senate took up and quickly passed the Governor's bill, while
the Democrat-led Assembly revived the Lentol-Rossetti bill, which the
Governor had vetoed the previous year.42 The two bills, though sharing
many common elements, had two major differences: first, LentolRossetti included more lenient penalties on striking unions and workers,
and second, Lentol-Rossetti would decentralize the administration of the
law, giving local governments and other political subdivisions
significant discretion in coordinating collective bargaining rules.43
Though the Democrat-backed Lentol-Rossetti bill seemed more
union friendly with its more lenient penalties, public employee support
was actually split between the two bills. While the well-established
public unions in New York City supported Lentol-Rossetti, both because
of its more lenient penalties as well as its decentralized approach which
favored strong local unions, upstate public labor was far less organized
and supported either bill as a vast improvement over Condon-Wadlin."
The Governor's bill, however, received overwhelming support from the
state's largest union, the Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA),
which saw the centralized administration of the Governor's bill as an
opportunity to strengthen and grow its labor presence outside of
Albany.45 With the strong support of CSEA, and after a small
compromise with the Lentol-Rossetti backers to satisfy the New York
City public unions,46 Governor Rockefeller's bill was enacted in 1967.47

40. See id. at 42.
41. See id. at 43 ("[T]he executive department believed that it had the constitutional
responsibility for employee relations and ought not to delegate it to the legislature.").
42. See id
43. See id

44.

See id at 45-46.

45. See id at 46.
46. Localities would be permitted to operate their own employee relations boards so long as
their procedures were "substantially equivalent" to, and approved by, the state's PERB. See N.Y.
Civ. SERV. LAW §212(1) (McKinney 2011).
47. Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, ch. 392, 1967 N.Y. Sess. Laws 393
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The first task in implementing the bill, which came to be known as
the Taylor Law, was establishing the State's Public Employee Relations
Board. 4 8 Through its first few years, PERB would be primarily occupied
by the first objective of the Taylor Law: organizing local unions and
holding representation elections. 4 9 At the time of enactment, 340,000 of
the estimated 900,000 state and local government employees covered by
the Taylor Law were already represented by unions, mostly in New York
City and Albany.50 Within one year of the law's enactment, an
additional 360,000 public employees would be represented by unions."
With most localities eager to work with employees to organize labor
unions, PERB's early work was fairly straightforward.
Even in the early organization efforts, PERB quickly became aware
that different labor issues would arise based on geography and industrial
sector. First, some regions, such as Albany, and labor sectors, especially
education, already had well-developed public sector unions. 5 2 Second,
PERB realized that New York City labor relations, as with so many
other issues, were completely different from those of the rest of the
state. Facing a teacher strike in New York City just months after the
Taylor Law was enacted, PERB "learned . .. that labor relations as

practiced in the Big Apple were different. The parties had developed
their own methods for settling differences." 54
D. Reconvening the Taylor Commission and the 1969 Amendments
In 1968, only one year after the enactment of the Taylor Law,
Governor Rockefeller reconvened the Taylor Commission to review the
law's progress and recommend any needed amendments. 5
The
Commission's revised report, published in 1969, emphasized four areas
of the law that could be strengthened. Tellingly, these four areas were
largely restatements of the initial report in areas where the Governor had
compromised in the initial law. 6 First, recognizing the unique character
of collective bargaining in New York City, the Commission
(McKinney) (codified as amended at N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW
48. See id. § 205.

49.

See id § 206.

50.

DONOVAN, supranote 3, at 67.

51.

Id. at 67-68.

52.

See id at 68.

53.
54.
55.
56.

See id.
Id. at 69.
See id at 109-10.
See id at 112-13.
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recommended that PERB work with the City's Office of Collective
Bargaining to develop custom bargaining and impasse procedures."
Second, the Commission recommended the establishment of a
permanent advisory council, essentially to replace the Taylor
Commission in the long term."
The other two recommendations reaffirmed the two keys of the
Commission's first report, both of which were compromised and
watered down in the actual legislation.
First, the Commission
recommended minor adjustments to the law's strike deterrents.
Second, and more significantly, the Commission stressed the importance
of binding resolution in impasse procedures.60
"The committee
maintained that to have an effective substitute for the strike there needed
to be finality in the impasse procedure and that any final judgment must
necessarily reside with the legislative body."61 By and large, the
Commission's follow-up report simply reinforced the recommendations
that had been ignored in the initial report.62
The 1969 amendments embraced these recommendations faithfully,
altering the strike penalty provisions, adding a legislative "show-cause"
hearing to impasse procedures, and giving PERB authority to define and
regulate "improper practices" in collective bargaining. 6 3 For the next
five years, the Taylor Law would largely resemble what the Taylor
Commission envisioned: a comprehensive collective bargaining
alternative to strikes that guaranteed meaningful input in negotiations for
employees and finality for employers and the public.64 Yet by the mid1970s, with representation issues largely settled, applying the collective
bargaining and impasse provisions of the Taylor Law would become the
focal point. With a strengthening union presence, particularly in the
education sector, the application of these provisions would begin to tip
the balance of power in the unions' favor.

57. See id at 113-14.
58. Seeid atll4.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 113.
61. Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
62. See id at 114-15 ("On the essential points of the inapplicability of the strike, on the
supremacy of the legislative body, on impasse procedures, and on strike penalties ... [the
Commission] remained steadfast. Its recommendations called into question the compromises made
by the legislature to get the law passed originally. . .
63. See Crotty, supra note 11.
64. See DONOVAN, supra note 3, at 113.
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II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRIBOROUGH AMENDMENT
A. The Triborough Doctrine and TriboroughAmendment

Of the early PERB decisions applying the collective bargaining and
impasse provisions of the Taylor Law, the most important was
Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Auth. v. Dist. Council 37 and Local
1396, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees

(Triborough).65 The case's holding and the subsequent case law over the
next decade would culminate in the 1982 amendment to the Taylor Law
adding section 209-a(1)(e), now better known as the Triborough
Amendment.66
In order to understand the importance of the
Amendment, however, its history must be explored.
Triborough was one of the earliest PERB decisions moving beyond
representation issues and on to regulating the collective bargaining
process. The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the
Triborough Bridge Authority and the transit workers' union included a
provision for "seniority based pay increments" for all employees. The
CBA expired in 1971, at which point the Authority announced that it
would no longer pay the seniority increments. The Union charged that
the Authority was violating section 209-a(1) of the Taylor Law,
arguing that the refusal to pay the seniority increments was an improper
employer practice because it would interfere with, restrain, or coerce
public employees to agree to a new contract and amounted to "a refusal
to negotiate in good faith."70
Under ordinary contract law, all the terms and conditions of the
expired contract would terminate with the expiration and the Union
would not have an argument.n In interpreting its authority under the
Taylor Law, however, PERB framed the issue as one of fairness in
collective bargaining, not one of contract law.72 In order to ensure fair
65.
66.

5 P.E.R.B.
Id.

67.
68.

See id; N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209-a(1)(a), (d) (McKinney 2011 & Supp. 2013).
Triborough,5 P.E.R.B. at 3064.

69.

CIV. SERV. § 209-a(1)(a), (d) (The law provides that "[i]t shall be an improper practice

3037, 3064, 3064-65 (1972).

for public employer or its agents deliberately (a) to interfere with, restrain or coerce public
employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in section two hundred two of this article for the
purpose of depriving them of such rights . . . (d) to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the duly
recognized or certified representatives of its public employees. . .
70. See id; Triborough, 5 P.E.R.B. at 3064-65.

71.

See Triborough,5 P.E.R.B. at 3064-65.

72. See id. at 3064. In rejecting "respondent's argument that the case was one involving
contract interpretation," the hearing officer reasoned "that the statutory prohibition against an
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bargaining, the current working conditions needed to be maintained;
otherwise, PERB reasoned, an employer could alter working conditions
to pressure employees to accept a new contract.7 3 Thus, it would be an
"improper employer practice" if the employer "unilaterally alter[s]
existing mandatory subjects of negotiations while a successor agreement
is being negotiated."7 4
While Triborough was a monumental case in applying the Taylor
Law to negotiations, the decision presented a complex legal question
that would require defining through additional cases: which terms of an
expired contract were "mandatory," meaning that altering them would
place unjust pressure on the employees to agree to a new contract? The
Triborough Board knew this was not an easy question and would best be
answered on a case-by-case basis, slowly drawing the contours of what
"mandatory" meant when applied to public sector collective bargaining
agreements.
Several cases over the next decade would address the
question from various angles as the term became gradually defined.
In Board of Educationof the City of Poughkeepsie v. Poughkeepsie
Public School Teachers Ass'n ("Poughkeepsie PSTA"), 6 a state court
addressed a similar question. In Poughkeepsie PSTA, the CBA expired
in 1972; shortly thereafter, the Union sought to grieve several issues
under the grievance procedure included in the expired agreement.7 7 The
District objected to the use of these procedures since the CBA had
expired.
The court found for the District, holding that the grievance
procedures did not survive the expiration of the CBA.
While
acknowledging that "the Legislature has not specifically stated whether
an agreement . . . shall remain in effect after its terminal date," the

specific provisions of the Taylor Law made "it clear that [the
Legislature] did not intend such extended duration."80 In the case at
hand, with the parties disputing the proper procedures for settling a
grievance, Taylor Law section 209 explicitly established an alternative

employee organization resorting to self-help by striking imposes a correlative duty upon a public
employer to refrain from altering terms and conditions of employment unilaterally during the course
of negotiations." The Board agreed. Id.

73.

See id at 3065.

74.

Id.

75.

See id at 3064-65.

76.

349 N.Y.S.2d 47, 47-48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).

77.

See id. at 48.

78.
79.
80.

See id
See id. at 50.
Id. at 48.
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procedure.s1
Without directly addressing Triborough, the court's
holding in Poughkeepsie PSTA nonetheless helps to clarify that the
Triborough doctrine is only concerned with maintaining the status quo
to ensure fairness in collective bargaining, not with preserving the terms
and conditions of an expired contract.
Later in the same year and the same court, the Triborough doctrine
was addressed head on. In Cardinalev. Anderson,82 the CBA between
the Baldwin School District and the Baldwin faculty union expired in
1973, with a provision that the contract would remain in effect unless
either party chose to terminate it. The District exercised this option on
the expiration date.83 The expired contract included procedures for
teachers to apply for, and the District to grant, yearly sabbaticals.84
After announcing the termination of the contract, the District took no
action on five pending applications, stating that since the CBA had
expired, the provisions had no binding effect on the coming school
year. 85 The Union filed a charge with PERB, claiming this action
violated section 209-a(1) of the Taylor Law, citing the Triborough
decision.8 6
In Cardinale, unlike in Poughkeepsie PSTA, the court needed to
directly address the Triborough ruling. The court found the doctrine
inapplicable because the issue of the case could hardly be considered a
"mandatory" subject of bargaining, as was the case in Triborough.87
Differentiating the case from Triborough, the court reasoned, "[flor
whatever the term "mandatory subject of negotiation" means, there must
be a difference between basic salary for all the teachers in a large school
district and possible Board approval of... sabbaticals for only twelve of
them."88 The court went on to warn against a broad application of
Triborough, stating "even [employer alteration of basic employee
benefits] may be legitimately occasioned by factors other than intent to
pressure teachers, as by budget or by facility cutbacks. Accordingly,
where such major interim changes occur, the issue still requires close
examination of employment circumstances." 89
The unease over the potential breadth of the Triborough doctrine
81.
82.
83.

See id at 49.
347 N.Y.S.2d 284 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
Id. at 285.

84.
85.
86.
87.

See id at 286.
See id.
See id. at 290.
See id. at 292.

88.
89.

Id
Id.
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displayed in Cardinale was shared by other courts. In Dobbs Ferry
Union Free School Districtv. Dobbs Ferry United Teachers,90 the court
gave a more direct voice to these concerns. There, the CBA between the
District and the Union was set to expire in 1976.91 However, the CBA
included a "survivorship" clause stating that the CBA would remain in
effect beyond the expiration date unless the contract had been "amended
or superseded."9 2 Such a clause presented the exact concern previous
courts had about the potential reach of the Triborough doctrine: if the
terms and conditions of a contract were maintained beyond its
expiration, "the [school] board would be in a handicapped position, and
at a serious disadvantage, because it either negotiates on the [Union's]
terms "or continue indefinitely" all the terms of the expired contract."9 3
After examining numerous cases that had addressed similar issues,
including Poughkeepsie PSTA and Cardinale,as well as a Syracuse Law
Review article 94 on the topic, the court struck down the provision as
counter to public policy. 95 Again, without explicitly weighing in on the
Triborough doctrine, the decision demonstrated the necessary balancing
act in defining what terms were "mandatory." 9 6 Dobbs Ferry cautions
against a broad definition, raising concerns over the doctrine's potential
to subvert the public interest in favor of guaranteeing harmonious labor
relations.
Dobbs Ferry also touched on a recent amendment to the Taylor
Law that further aroused concerns over the Triborough doctrine. In
1974, the Legislature inserted section 209(3)(f), which dealt specifically
with school boards, Board of Cooperative Educational Services
(BOCES), and other educational government agencies.97 Under section
209(3)(e), included in the original legislation, the final step of impasse
resolution for all public labor disputes was that the public employer and
the employee organization were both afforded the opportunity to submit
their recommendations to the legislative body, which then was required
to hold a public hearing and "thereafter. . . take such action as it deems

90. 395 N.Y.S.2d 988 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
91. See id at989.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 994 (citing Niagara Wheatfield Adm'rs Ass'n v. Niagara Wheatfield Cent. Sch.
Dist., 54 A.D.2d 498, 502 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) vacated,44 N.Y.2d 68 (N.Y. 1978)).
94. See generally Robert F. Koretz & Robert J. Rabin, Labor Relations Law, 26 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 125 (1975).
95. Dobbs Ferry,395 N.Y.S.2d at 991-95.
96. See id
97. 1967 N.Y. Sess. Laws 593-94 (codified as amended at N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 209(3)(f)
(McKinney 2011 & Supp. 2013)).
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to be in the public interest" to resolve the impasse. 98 This was the
statutory language employing the "legislative oversight" and finality in
impasse resolution that the Taylor Commission saw as so important to
an effective collective bargaining system. 99 Section 209(3)(f), however,
eliminated the legislative oversight function for school boards and other
educational government agencies, leaving the impasse resolution
procedure open-ended. 00 "In this manner, by eliminating the final
hearing with the School Board acting as a legislative body, a new
collective bargaining agreement will only be entered into if both parties
accept its terms."0t
The 1974 Amendment only furthered the courts' concern over the
potential of the Triborough doctrine. The courts were already concerned
that a broad application of the Triborough doctrine would require
carrying forward most, if not all, terms and conditions of employment
under the expired contract. 102 This would mean that "[t]he employees
then would always start where they previously left off. They would be
locked into a guaranteed gain position, and the employers into an
assured losing stance ... the union would have no place to go but up."l 0 3
The 1974 Amendment only exacerbated the seriousness of this concern:
without finality and legislative oversight in impasse resolution, the union
would essentially have a veto over any changes to the terms and
conditions of employment. The court in Dobbs Ferryworried about this
exact point, arguing that the result would be contrary to the public
interest:
Such a contractual provision which would permit ... [a] public
body ... to vest in a union of its employees the power unilaterally to

98. N.Y. CIv. SERv. LAW §209(3)(e) (McKinney 2011).
99. See DONOVAN, supra note 3, at 113 ("The committee maintained that to have an effective
substitute for the strike there needed to be finality in the impasse procedure and that any final
judgment must necessarily reside with the legislative body.").
100. See N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 209(3)(f) (McKinney 2011 & Supp. 2013) ("[Wihere the
public employer is a school district, a board of cooperative educational services, a community
college, the state university of New York, or the city university of New York, the provisions of
subparagraphs (iii) and (iv) of paragraph (e) of this subdivision shall not apply, and (i) the board
may afford the parties an opportunity to explain their positions with respect to the report of the factfinding board at a meeting at which the legislative body, or a duly authorized committee thereof,
may be present; (ii) thereafter, the legislative body may take such action as is necessary and
appropriate to reach an agreement.
The board may provide such assistance as may be
appropriate.").
101. Dobbs Ferry, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 992 (citations omitted).
102. See Cardinale v. Anderson, 347 N.Y.S.2d 284, 292 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
103. Id. (emphasis added).
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perpetuate for an indefinite or indeterminate period of time,
determinable only at the sufferance of such Union, wages and other
terms and conditions of employment, regardless of the economic
conditions of the school district or municipality, would be violative of
the public interest and public policy. 10
In 1977 the Court of Appeals weighed in on the matter in BOCES
Rockland County v. N.Y. State PERB.'os There, the CBA between
BOCES and the Union included a provision for "[a] progression of
automatic step increments for employees in the unit."'10 6 When the CBA
expired in 1974, but before negotiations began, BOCES announced it
would honor all the terms and conditions of the expired contract, except
that wages and benefits would remain at the levels in effect at the
expiration date.' 07 The Union challenged the refusal to extend the step
increment provision as a violation of section 209 of the Taylor Law,
citing Triborough.08 PERB applied Triborough and found for the
Union, ordering BOCES to cease and desist its refusal to pay the step
increments. 109 On appeal, the appellate court reversed PERB's ruling in
part, holding that PERB only had the authority to enter an order for the
employer to negotiate in good faith, and not an order of specific
performance for BOCES to pay the salary increments.1 10
BOCES appealed to the New York State Court of Appeals, which
accepted in order to give due consideration to the Triborough
doctrine."' As in previous lower court cases addressing Triborough,the
court closely criticized the doctrine without outright overturning the
decision. The court critiqued the doctrine, when broadly applied, as
counter to the public interest by ignoring and interfering with fiscal and
political responsibilities of the public employer. 1 12
Specifically
addressing the continued enforcement of salary step increases, the Court
of Appeals fervently warned of the potential troubles:
As a reward and by encouraging the retention of experienced personnel
in public positions, the concept of increments based on continuance in
service, properly exercised, is creditable for the public entity and the
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Dobbs Ferry, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 994.
363 N.E.2d 1174 (N.Y. 1977).
Id at 1175.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1176.
See id. at 1174.
See id at 1176.
See id at 1177.
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citizenry are better served. .. The concept of continual successive
annual increments, however, is tied into either constantly burgeoning
growth and prosperity on the part of the public employer ... or a
continuing general inflationary spiral, without admeasurement either of
the growth or inflation and without consideration of several other
relevant good faith factors such as comparative compensation, the
condition of the public fisc and a myriad of localized strengths and
difficulties. 113
The court went on to further criticize the application of Triborough
to pay increment provisions:
To say that the status quo must be maintained during negotiations is
one thing; to say that the status quo includes a change and means
automatic salary increases is another . .. The inherent fallacy of
PERB's reasoning is that it seeks to make automatic increments a
matter of right, without regard to the particular facts and
circumstances. ...

Thus, while not completely upending the Triborough decision, the
Court of Appeals ruling in BOCES Rockland County was a robust
warning of the hazardous potential of the doctrine if stretched too far.

B. Enacting the Triborough Amendment
While the Court in Rockland County BOCES stopped short of
overturning Triborough, and PERB continued to apply the doctrine in a
variety of cases, the long-term fate of the doctrine was uncertain with a

critical decision from the State's highest court in the background.
Strong pro-union advocates, including Assemblyman Joseph R. Lentol,
one of the primary sponsors of the Lentol-Rossetti Bill, pushed for
legislative change to the Taylor Law that would protect the Triborough
doctrine and roll back Rockland County BOCES."' In 1978, the
Legislature passed a union-sponsored bill that would amend the Taylor
Law by making it an improper practice to "refuse to continue all the
terms of an expired agreement until a new agreement is negotiated."ll 6
This bill fell to Governor Carey's veto, as did an identical bill passed the
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Mary Helen Moses, Scope of Bargaining and the Triborough Law: New York's
Collective BargainingDilemma, 56 ALB. L. REV. 53, 82 (1992).
116. Id. at 83 (citing A. 12710, Leg., 201st Sess. (N.Y. 1978); A. 4165, Leg., 202d Sess. (N.Y.
1979)) (emphasis added).
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following year.117 Three years later, however, the Governor finally
conceded to the union's pressure and signed section 209-a(l)(e), better
known as the Triborough Amendment, into law.' 18
As Part III will explore, the Amendment's abandonment of the
reasoning and purpose of its namesake decision and legal doctrine
dramatically changes the doctrine's purpose, serving instead to protect
public employees at the expense of the public interest.
III. THE FUNCTION AND IMPACT OF THE TRIBOROUGH AMENDMENT

A. How the Amendment Strays from the Doctrine
The Triborough doctrine, as developed through decisions such as
Troy City School District v. Troy Teachers Ass'n"l9 and County of
Suffolk v. Suffolk County Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass 'n,120 was
grounded in the notion that the purpose of extending the terms and
conditions of a contract beyond its expiration date was the preservation
of the status quo to ensure a level bargaining field.121 Defining the term
"status quo" is at the very heart of the Triborough line of cases. While
the Triborough decision held "an employee organization which does not
strike is entitled to the maintenance of the status quo during
negotiations," it only went so far as defining the "status quo" as
prohibiting the employer from "unilaterally altering existing mandatory
subjects of negotiations while a successor agreement is being
negotiated." 22 Defining "status quo," by delineating "mandatory" from
"permissive" or "illegal" subjects of bargaining, would require careful
case-by-case consideration. The Triborough line of cases worked to
draw the contours of the term "status quo."
In the first several cases, PERB defined the term "status quo"
broadly, giving a wide application to the Triborough doctrine.123 Rather
than delineating "mandatory" subjects of bargaining from other subjects,
PERB recognized three exceptions to a general application of
Triborough.124 First, an employer was not required to maintain the

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Moses, supranote 115, at 83.
See N.Y. CIV. SERv. LAW § 209-a(1)(e) (McKinney 2011 & Supp. 2013).
8 P.E.R.B. 4561, 4679 (1975), rev'don othergrounds, 9 P.E.R.B. T 3039, 3068 (1976).
9 P.E.R.B. 14537 aff'd 9 P.E.R.B. 13080 (1976).
See id at 4606; Troy City Sch. Dist., 8 P.E.R.B. at 4680.
See Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Auth. v. AFL-CIO, 5 P.E.R.B. 13037, 3065 (1972).
See supra Part H.A.
See Triborough, 5 P.E.R.B. at 3065.
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"status quo" if the employee union engaged in an illegal strike. 12 5
Second, any dispute resolution procedures included in an expired
contract did not survive because the Taylor Law specifically created and
imposed an alternative procedure when no contractual method existed.12 6
Third, an employer was permitted to make minimal unilateral changes
under certain "compelling reasons" circumstances. 12 7
When the courts began reviewing Triborough decisions they
limited the scope of the doctrine's application and restricted PERB's
broad definition of the term "status quo."l 28 Part of this was a struggle
over PERB's claim of exclusive authority in the realm of public sector
collective bargaining.129 But the courts also raised concerns over the
conflict between a broad interpretation of Triborough and the public
interest in an efficient and effective government.130 The Rockland
County BOCES decision by the New York Court of Appeals (while not
outright rejecting the Triborough doctrine) seriously questioned whether
the doctrine's application had strayed too far from the decision's
In rejecting the applicability of
reasoning and justification.'"'
Triborough to the case at hand, the court argued "[t]he reasons ...
should be apparent. Involving a delicate balance between fiscal and
other responsibilities, [the doctrine's] perpetuation is fraught with
problems, equitable and economic in nature." 3 2 The court went on to
address the particular issue at hand, mandating perpetual automatic
salary increases beyond the contract's expiration, arguing that such a

125. See Vill. of Valley Stream v. Local 342, Long Island Pub. Serv. Emps. Union, 6 P.E.R.B.
4536, 4631 (1973), aff'd, 6 P.E.R.B. 1 3076, 3125 (1973); Somers Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Somers
Faculty Ass'n, 9 P.E.R.B. 4521, 4573-74 (1976).
126. See Bd. of Ed. of Poughkeepsie v. Poughkeepsie PSTA, 349 N.Y.S.2d 47, 49 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1973) (holding that dispute resolution provision of expired contract did not survive because New
York Civil Service Law § 209 created an explicit alternative). See also Port Chester-Rye Union
Free Sch. Dist. v. Port Chester Teachers Ass'n, 10 P.E.R.B. 3079, 3133 (1977) (holding that the
provision to arbitrate is no longer in effect because the contract has expired).
127. See Cent. Sch. Dist. No. I of Wappinger v. Wappinger Cent. Sch., Faculty Ass'n, Inc., 5
P.E.R.B. 3074 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 5 P.E.R.B. 5412 (1972). In Wappinger, PERB
permitted the school district to unilaterally alter class loads for math and science teachers after the
contract expired, reasoning that class loads were non-economic issues and there were "compelling
reasons" (i.e. the scheduling of the school program) for the timing of the employer's action.
128. See, e.g., Rockland Cnty. BOCES v. N.Y. State Pub. Emp. Relations Bd., 363 N.E.2d
1174, 1176 (N.Y. 1977) (limiting PERB's enforcement authority to the entry of an order directing
the public employer to negotiate in good faith).
129. See Triborough, 5 P.E.R.B. at 3065 (holding that there was "no question of contract
interpretation" and the board should not "defer to arbitration").
130. See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
131. See Rockland Cnty. BOCES, 363 N.E.2d at 1178.
132. Id. at 1177.
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policy disregards the economic realities of public sector labor
bargaining. 133 In sum, the court recognized the initial reasoning
supporting the Triborough doctrine, while raising concerns that the
doctrine was being overstretched by noting the inherent conflict with the

public benefit. 134
The Triborough Amendment, however, is not grounded in this same
reasoning. The legislators who supported and approved the Triborough
Amendment likely believed that the Amendment would simply codify
the Triborough doctrine and roll back the restrictions BOCES of
Rockland County placed on the doctrine.s3 5 One of the bill's sponsors
suggested a different incentive, however, arguing that "public employees
need protection from irresponsible public employers who abuse the
Taylor Law."' 3 6 The idea of an amendment affording public employees
protection in negotiations differs from the intended purpose of the
Triborough doctrine-to ensure fairness in negotiations.
The
Governor's approval memorandum voiced similar concerns with the
Amendment that had led him to twice veto the bill, particularly that the
language of the Amendment went far beyond the scope of the
Triborough decision as interpreted by the courts.137
Two specific portions of the Amendment provide evidence
supporting the Governor's concern that the Amendment did far more
than codify the Triborough decision. First, the phrase "terms of an
expired agreement" is used, instead of "mandatory terms of
bargaining."' 38 The court in Cardinalecautioned that an overly broad
interpretation of the doctrine would extend application beyond the
reasoning of PERB in that case, which sought only to preserve the status
quo of employment to ensure fair bargaining. 13 9 The wording used in

133. See id (holding that continual successive annual increments is problematic because it did
not take into account other factors such as inflation or employer's good faith efforts in meeting its
obligations).
134. See id. (noting that there are reasons for status quo to be maintained, but the status quo
shall not be interpreted so broadly as to include automatic increases in salary). in Triborough,
PERB recognized this concern but rejected it. See Triborough, 5 P.E.R.B. at 3065 ("[R]espondent
expresses concern that the hearing officer's decision would prevent an employer from ever changing
the terms and conditions of employment.. .. Respondent's concerns are not borne out by the
statute. . . which under some circumstances include mandatory mediation and fact finding.").
135. See Rockland Cnty. BOCES, 363 N.E.2d.1173.
136. Melissa M. McGuire, Note, The Effect of New York's TriboroughLaw on Public Sector
Labor Negotiations, 48 ALB. L. REV. 459, 482 (1983).
137. See DONOVAN, supra note 3, at 188-89. One commentator noted "the memorandum
itself is interesting because until the very end it reads as though it were a preamble to a veto." Id.
138. N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 209-a(1)(e) (McKinney 2011 & Supp. 2013).
139. See Cardinale v. Anderson, 347 N.Y.S.2d 284, 292 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
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the Triborough Amendment, however, is concerned with the contract
only, not the actual bargaining atmosphere.14 0 Second, the provision
covers "all" terms of an expired contract, effectively eliminating the
"mandatory/non-mandatory" subject of bargaining question, which was
so vital to the reasoning in the discussion of Triborough.141 As the
Triborough line of case law demonstrated, the courts and PERB were
continuously struggling with the proper breadth of the doctrine's
application. Far from furthering the doctrine and contributing to this
important legal discussion, the enactment of the Triborough Amendment
fundamentally altered the very question the Triborough cases sought to
answer.
C. An Imperfect Fitfor Public Sector Collective Bargaining
At first, the difference between the Triborough doctrine and the
Triborough Amendment may seem subtle, but the Amendment amounts
to a shift in the very foundation underlying the doctrine. Not only did
the Amendment roll back Rockland County BOCES, but it
fundamentally changed the very question PERB set out to answer in
Triborough. In that seminal case, PERB recognized the difficult
balancing act the issue presented and saw the challenge as one of
ensuring fair bargaining while also preserving the employer's authority
to operate. 142
In a way, the Triborough doctrine is a product of the Taylor
Commission's imperfect attempt to adapt a private sector collective
bargaining model to the public sector. While the Taylor Commission
attempted to address this imperfect fit through some of its
recommendations, 4 3 notably the importance of finality in impasse
resolution and reducing the penalties for illegal strikes, Triborough arose
out of PERB's efforts to calibrate bargaining leverage in actual practice,
imposing a duty on the employer as a counterpoint to "the statutory
prohibition against an employee organization resorting to self-help by
The shortcoming of Triborough, however, partially
striking."'"
140. See Civ. SERV. § 209-a(1)(e).
141. See id. (mandating that employer must "continue all the terms of an expired agreement
until a new agreement is negotiated") (emphasis added); cf Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Auth. v.
AFL-CIO, 5 P.E.R.B. 3037, 3064-65 (1972). ("[A]n employer cannot unilaterally alter existing
mandatory subjects of negotiations while a successor agreement is being negotiated.") (emphasis
added).
142. See Triborough, 5 P.E.R.B. 3037, 3064.
143. See supranotes 55-64 and accompanying text.
144. See Triborough, 5 P.E.R.B. at 3064.
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recognized by the "compelling reason[]" exception 4 5 and by the Court
of Appeals in Rockland County BOCES,146 is that the doctrine overstates
the impact of the prohibition on striking. In attempting to counterweigh
the effect of the statutory strike ban on negotiations, the Taylor Law fails
to recognize that there are numerous other factors in public sector
collective bargaining that diminish the employer's bargaining leverage.
There are at least three noteworthy characteristics of public sector
collective bargaining that set it apart from the private sector by
diminishing the public employer's bargaining leverage. First, public
employers, unlike their private sector counterpart, are sovereign
entities.147 While this permits public employers to impose a strike ban
on employees, it also strips the employer of their biggest source of
leverage-the ability to "pick up shop." 48 Public employers are, by
their very nature, charged with providing specific services to a specific
territory, and therefore they cannot move away and, more importantly,
they cannot go out of business.149
Second, because of the sovereignty of the employer, public
employees hold a piece of leverage that their private sector counterparts
do not: the ability to pressure the employer across the bargaining table
through the ballot box and other public channels.so All public
employers are, directly or indirectly, representatives of the public and
subject to election.'"' Strong public unions, particularly in elections
with low voter turnout, such as school board elections, can have a
disproportionate impact on the vote: "At the heart of local politics is the
astounding fact that teachers unions are in a position to determine who
sits on local school board, and thus who they will be bargaining
with .. .Needless to say [unions] have strong incentives to [engage in
local politics].,,152 Between the high incentive for unions to engage in
local elections, the low turnout in many of these elections, the non145. See Cent. Sch. Dist. No. I of Wappinger v. Wappinger Cent. Sch., Faculty Ass'n., Inc., 5
P.E.R.B. 3074 (1972),
146. See Rockland Cnty. BOCES, 363 N.E.2d at 1177.
147. See Leo Troy, Are Municipal Collective Bargaining and Municipal Governance
Compatible?, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 453, 453 (2003).
148. See id. at 461 ("Approval or disproval of the results in the public sector can only be
addressed through an election, a procedure which comes at discrete intervals and can be
manipulated during the political process. As a result, public employers are virtually immune to
markets.").
149. See Moses, supra note 115, at 63.
150. See Troy, supranote 147, at 454-455.
151. See Bonventre, supranote 31, at 6.
152. Terry M. Moe, Teachers Unions and the Public Schools, in A PRIMER ON AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS 151, 167 (Terry M. Moe ed., 2001).
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partisan nature of school board elections, and the large impact of even
small donations in races,
unions can very easily have a greatly
disproportionate impact on local elections. 154 As one commentator
argues
[T]he most important difference in collective bargaining between [the
public
and private]
sectors
is, again, the political
dimension ... particularly so at the local level. At the local level of
government ... the public employer, as an elected official is largely
dependent on the union's wealth and membership (the voters). 155
Third, the political dimension of public sector collective bargaining
also contributes to how bargains are made.156 Since public employers
are elected officials, greater attention is paid to the short-term costs of an
agreement, which public officials feel the greatest public pressure over.
The result is a strong incentive to win short-term concessions, which the
public official will gain praise for, in exchange for long-term and nonmonetary benefits. The Triborough Amendment further facilitates this
approach to bargaining by eliminating the line between "mandatory" and
"permissive" subjects of collective bargaining."' The Amendment puts

153. See id. at 167-68.
154. See id. at 169. Moe frequently notes in Teacher Unions and the Public Schools, as well
as elsewhere, how very little is actually known or studied about the impact of public unions on
elections, though the existing evidence all indicates that they have remarkable influence. Id.; see
also Troy, supra note 147, at 474 (noting that both the NEA and AFT "must be regarded as
significant obstacles to any competitive challenges because of their monopoly grip on public
education."); FREDERICK M. HESS & MARTIN WEST, HARVARD UNIV. PROGRAM ON EDUC. POLICY

AND GOVERNANCE, A BETTER BARGAIN: OVERHAULING TEACHER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY 33 (2005) ("[A]hnost 60 percent of [school] board members nationwide say
teachers unions are "very active" or "somewhat active" in their local elections.").
155. Troy, supra note 147, at 457 (emphasis added); see also Terry M. Moe, The Union Label
on the Ballot Box, 6 ED. NEXT no. 3, Summer 2006, 59, 59. ("Special interests, well organized and
largely unchecked by the public, often have ample opportunity to engineer outcomes in their own
favor.").
156. See Clyde Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: A Different Animal, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 441, 446-47 (2003).
157. See In re. Greenburgh No. 11 Fed'n of Teachers and Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free
School Dist., 32 P.E.R.B. 1 3024, 3046-48 (1999) (holding that permissive subjects that have been
placed within the parties' collectively negotiated agreement are treated as mandatory subjects for all
purposes). While several PERB decisions have delineated certain terms or conditions of
employment as "permissive," once a "permissive" term is negotiated into a contract, it is treated as a
"mandatory" term for all purposes, including requiring bargaining over the matter in subsequent
negotiations. See, e.g., West lrondequoit Teachers Ass'n v. Helsby, 35 N.E.2d 775, 776-78 (N.Y.
1974) (holding class sizes are a non-mandatory bargaining subject); In re. Greece Teachers Assoc.
v. Greece Central School District, 22 P.E.R.B. 1 3005, 3016, 3018 (1989) (holding number of
teacher assignments per class day is a non-mandatory bargaining subject).
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everything on the table for negotiations, allowing public officials to
bargain away managerial decisions for short-term cost savings.' Public
officials, concerned first and foremost with the budget's bottom line, are
willing to negotiate away discretion on work rules in exchange for
avoiding large pay raises. 159
Rather than address and correct these issues with the Triborough
doctrine, the Triborough Amendment reinforces and "doubles down" on
these errors. 160 The Triborough Amendment drifts beyond the initial
Triborough doctrine, which itself was faulty for overlooking the many
unique pressures and limits already placed on the public employer at the
bargaining table.' 6 1 Over the past thirty years, what began as an attempt
by PERB to adapt a private sector collective bargaining scheme to the
public sector has become a law concerned only with protecting public
employees and preventing labor unrest at any and all cost. This not only
disposes of the initial intent of the Triborough ruling, but also ignores
the public's interest in an efficient, effective and sustainable
government. As Part IV will show through a case study of the Buffalo
City School District, the Triborough Amendment has placed school
districts and municipalities across the state in an unstable and
unsustainable fiscal position.
IV. A CASE STUDY OF THE BUFFALO CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT

Buffalo is the second largest city in New York and the largest
school district in the state outside of New York City, serving around
34,000 students in nearly sixty school facilities, not including a robust
charter sector.162 Like many urban districts, particularly those with
158. See Summers, supra note 156, at 447-48 (discussing the implications of bargaining over
managerial prerogatives, such as student discipline, behind closed doors); Terry M. Moe, A Union
by any Other Name, 1 EDUC. NEXT no. 3, Fall 2001, 40, 41-42 (discussing common work rules
unions negotiate to protect and expand their membership base, including limiting pay, transfers,
promotions and assignments based on performance, increasing union input on teaching schedules,
curriculum, materials and equipment, and union involvement in discipline and grievance
procedures).
159. HESS & WEST, supra note 154, at 25 ("More important than the average dollar amounts
[of fringe benefits], however, is the way that these benefits are structured. They reward longevity
alone, thereby crippling a district's ability to compete for highly qualified new or mid-career
candidates in an increasingly national labor market.").
160. See discussion supraPart HIA.
161. See discussion supraPart III.A.
162. Esther Scott & Martin Linsky, A Time of Reckoning: Crisis in the Buffalo Public School
System, 2 J. CASES EDUC. LEADERSHIP 22, 23 (1999); DistrictDirectory Information, NAT'L CTR.
FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/districtsearch/districtdetail.asp?ID2=3605850 (last
visited Dec. 27, 2013); Annual Estimates of the Resident Population:April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2012,
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declining enrollment, Buffalo has continuously faced financial pressure.
This section takes a look at Buffalo's history of negotiating contracts
with the Buffalo Teachers Federation, the District's largest bargaining
unit, as a case study of the real world implications of the restraints
imposed by the Taylor Law on school districts.
A. A BriefHistory of Buffalo's Teacher Union ContractNegotiationsl63
Throughout the 1960s, Buffalo's economic prosperity permitted
school budgets to be constructed without significant concern over
revenues.1 6 4 Budgets and labor contracts were established without
significant conflict, infamously being hashed out in Mayor Frank
Sedita's basement.'6 ' Along with a shift from a mayoral appointed to an
elected school board, the City's growing financial hardship in the 1970s
brought about significant changes for the District. 6 6 Over the decade,
Buffalo would lose over 40,000 jobs and see its population decline by
23%.167 When the first elected school board members took office in
1974, the city was in the nadir of its decline.168 The newly elected
school board was determined to ensure the District would remain

financially sound.16 9
When contract negotiations opened up in 1976 the Board took a
hard line, proposing significant program cuts and refusing to increase
teacher salaries.170 Likely expecting a counter offer, the District was
shocked when the union rejected the offer and went on strike, thereby
violating the Taylor Law.' 7 ' The 20-day strike, coupled with the
demands of the Buffalo Teachers Federation (BTF) for salary raises,
improved medical coverage, restoration of previously cut programming,
and additional benefits signaled a mammoth gap between the Board and
the Union's positions.17 2 While many in the public were sympathetic to
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsflpages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk (last visited
Sept. 16, 2013).
163. Much of the research on the history of contract negotiations in the Buffalo Public Schools
comes from archive research from Rebecca Bass, on file with the author.
164. See Dave Ernst, Has Electing Altered School Board?,BUFFALO NEWS, Apr. 10, 1982.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See Scott & Linsky, supra note 162, at 24.
168. See id. at 24-25.
169. See id at25.
170. See Ernst, supranote 164.
171. See id.
172. See id.
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the teachers, many also believed that the BTF's demands were simply
not realistic for a city on the verge of bankruptcy.173
A PERB arbitration panel largely sided with the BTF's demands.174
While the District saw the panel's proposal as more costly than it likely
could handle, the District was desperate to end the strike. While making
significant gains in the contract, the BTF membership was nonetheless
appalled by the fines imposed for the strike that would be used to fund
the contracted raises. 7 5 The negotiations, strike, and final contract of
1976 left both sides greatly disappointed and created significant tension
between them.
Through the 1980s the City ran up significant deficits covering the
terms of the contract while also implementing court-ordered
desegregation efforts.17 6 This era created significant tension between the
City and the District, especially during Mayor Jimmy Griffin's tenure,
who regularly protested the financial drain caused by the District.17
Over the same period, State funding to the District supporting Buffalo's
lauded magnet system exploded. Between the two funding sources, the
District's budget increased by 182% between 1981 and 1997, with the
District's workforce vastly outpacing enrollment growth.178
In 1989 a slate of candidates supported by Mayor Griffin narrowly
edged a group of BTF-backed candidates.' 79 The election coincided
with an end to the free-flowing state funding, with the State in poor
financial shape. 80 With funding tightening, contract negotiations in
1989 quickly became contentious, again requiring PERB intervention.18 '
The panel recommended significant salary increases aimed at closing the
salary gap between the City and surrounding suburban districts.1 82
Newly appointed Superintendent Albert Thompson was unconvinced,
however, believing that the panel's approach overlooked the generous
health care and retirement benefits that City teachers enjoyed. 8 1
Eventually Thompson and BTF President Phil Rumore reached a
173. Time for BTF to Cut Its Losses, BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 18, 1976, at C-2.
174. See Ernst, supranote 164.
175. See Darryl Campagna & Peter Simon, Opening-Day Relief Teachers Relent on Threat of
Job Action, BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 6, 2000.
176. See Scott & Linsky, supra note 162, at 25-26.
177. See, e.g. City vs. Schools: A Numbers Game, BUFFALO NEWS, May 6, 1984, at Al-A2;
see also Ernst,supra note 164.
178. See Scott & Linsky, supranote 162, at 26 & Ex. 4.
179. See id. at 27.
180. See id. at 28.
181. See id. at 30.
182. See id.
183. See id
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compromise in a series of one-on-one, closed-door negotiations,
providing teachers a significant salary raise in exchange for increased
contributions to health and retirement benefits.184 To both parties'
surprise, however, the Board rejected the contract by one vote.' 85
With many accusing the Board of rejecting the contract out of spite
over the concealed nature of the negotiations, Board members argued
that the contract was simply not fiscally feasible. 86 In particular,
members were concerned that the proposal relied too heavily on state aid
increases that were far from certain. 187 After the rejection, the BTF
refused to renew negotiations. Instead, the Union filed an improper
practice charge with PERB, accusing the Board of improper
communications with their chief negotiator and arguing that the District
had waived its right to approve the contract. 88 PERB ruled for the BTF
in 1991, ordering the implementation of the contract. 89
The 1991 PERB decision set off a dispute that would not be fully
resolved until 2000. The District quickly appealed the decision, arguing
that PERB did not have authority to mandate implementation of the
contract; the matter became tied up in legal proceedings. In 1994, the
year the contract was set to expire, a State Supreme Court judge reversed
the PERB ruling.'9" While both sides initially hoped the ruling could be
a chance for a fresh start, the relationship quickly soured and the BTF
appealed the Court's ruling, putting an end to any negotiations.' 9 '
The mid-1990s saw political change in Buffalo, with a new Mayor
and a new majority on the School Board bringing hope for
reconciliation.192 When negotiations reopened in August 1994, with the
BTF's appeal of the Court ruling still pending, the District hoped to
peacefully reach an agreement and proposed a contract retroactively
applying from 1990, therefore ending the back-pay litigation, through

184. See id.
185. See id. at 32-33.
186. John C. Doyle, Op-Ed., Just for the Record, Buffalo, Good Sense Wasn't Missing from
the Whole School Board, BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 15, 1997.
187. See Scott & Linsky, supra note 162, at 32.
188. See Buffalo's Crisis Shouts a Warning to Albany: Fix the Legal Structure that Let this
Happen, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 12,1996.
189. This ruling would go on to spark criticism of PERB, with opponents protesting the
authority of an appointed panel to override an elected body. Id.
190. James Heaney, Talks Held on Teachers Contract; School Superintendent, Union Leader
Hope to Settle 4-Year Dispute Out of Court, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 18, 1994.
191. See Scott & Linsky, supra note 162, at 35.
192. James Heaney, Summit Planned on Improving City Public Schools, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec.
7, 1995.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol31/iss1/5

26

Zwara: Left in the Dark: How New York's Taylor Law Impairs Collective Ba
2013]

TAYLOR LA W1IPAIRS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

219

1996, with a total 19% salary increase over the period.19 3 Any hope of
reconciling was quickly lost when the BTF rejected the contract and
threatened to strike.194
With the District well aware of the effects of the 1976 strike, it
sought to carefully avoid another strike.' 95 The District and the Union
appealed to the City, jointly and separately, for an increase in funding, a
request promptly rejected by City Hall.196 This left the Superintendent
Ultimately, the
facing either a strike or a huge budget gap.
Superintendent agreed to a risky proposal from BTF President Phillip
Rumore. The District would agree to a three-year contract, with a total
27.2% raise, and the District and the Union would make a joint
commitment to find $90 million to settle back payments for retirees.' 97
If this effort failed, however, the Union would have the right to sue the
District to recover to the full extent allowed by law.198 With this
agreement, the back-pay issue, originating in 1990, would extend
through at least 1997. The looming threat of a strike was enough to
persuade the Board to sign off on the settlement.' 99
Over the next two years it became obvious that the District would
be unable to secure the necessary funding to settle the outstanding backpay issue.200 To make matters worse, the state not only imposed a freeze
on school aid, it actually revoked $4 million previously allocated for the
1Through the early 1990s the District had maintained the
District.201
appearance of fiscal stability by ignoring long-term costs and assuming
unprecedented aid.202 The 1990 state funding cut, coupled with possible
liability for the 1990 back payments, revealed the depth of the District's
fiscal problems.203
The District's obvious financial problems helped temper tensions
during negotiations in 1996; the Union was well aware that the District
193. See Scott & Linsky, supra note 162, at 37.
194. See id
195. See id at 40.
196. See id at 38.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 40.
199. James Heaney, MediatorProves Key to Teachers Contract;Both Sides Credit Kaufinan
with Keeping Strained Negotiations at the Table, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 26, 1994. Several Board
members had convinced themselves that if the back pay issue continued to be litigated it would
ultimately end in the District's favor. See Scott & Linsky, supra note 162, at 42.
200. See Memorandum from Jim Shannon, Consulting Analyst on Strategic Analysis of the
Buffalo Sch. Dist. Financial and Structural Crisis to James Harris, Superintendent (Feb. 1, 1997).
201. See Scott & Linsky, supranote 162, at 36.
202. See id at 26.
203. See id at 36-37.
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did not have the financial capability to meet any major salary or benefit
increases.204 While this helped assure peaceful negotiations, it hardly
harmed the Union's position. As a newspaper headline described the
negotiations, the "Board sacrificed savings to win peace with
teachers." 20 5
Despite an analysis from the Buffalo Fiscal Plan
Commission recommending that the District could save $20 million
through negotiations, the final contract only saved $3.5 million.206
Further, as in previous negotiations, the contract unrealistically relied on
anticipated state and city aid that would not be forthcoming.20 7
In 2000, the District's fiscal gambles to ensure labor tranquility
once again became a factor. In 1996 a New York State Appellate Court
overruled the lower court's decision for the District on the 1990 contract
dispute; 208 four years later the District finally settled the litigation with
the Union. 2 09 Under the settlement, the District would pay $73 million
to cover a significant portion of the 1990 contracted raises.210 Unable to
cover the amount, the District relied on the lobbying efforts of local
politicians, who secured a $45 million interest-free loan from the
State. 2 1 1 The loan, however, came with numerous conditions requiring
the District to submit to greater fiscal oversight by the city and the
state.2 12
The ten-year delay and six years of litigation ensured that tensions
with teachers over the back payments would be high. Due to poor
record keeping, which made it difficult to calculate the payments, the
delay would be even longer.213 In the meantime, negotiations on the
contract that had expired in 1999 remained on hold. The tension over
the back payments had boiled over into the contract negotiations.
Frustrated by the stagnant negotiations, the BTF Executive Committee
took a vote of no confidence in the District leadership. The District
became frustrated, and worried, when the BTF began preparing to call a
204.
205.

See id. at 41.
James Heaney, Board Sacrificed Savings; To Win Peace with Teachers, BUFFALO NEWS,

Nov. 17, 1996.
206. See id.
207. See id
208. James Heaney, Pay Ruling Stuns City; Staggering Debt to Teachers Leaves Future
Unclear, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 20, 1996.
209. Murray B. Light, Op-Ed., Astute Legislature Can Be Thanked For Teacher Money,
BUFFALO NEWS, June 18, 2000.

210. See id.
211. See id.
212. Robert J. McCarthy, Oversight ofSchools to Increase, BUFFALO NEWS, June 10, 2000.
213. Darryl Campagna, Teachers Might Have to Wait Awhile for Back Pay, BUFFALO NEWS,
July 21, 2000.
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strike. 214
On the first day of classes in September 2000, the BTF called a
strike at seven o'clock in the morning, just one hour before classes
would begin.2 15 Despite a court order to end the strike, the BTF called a
second strike the following Monday at 7:05 AM. The timing of the
strikes, with hundreds of children already en route to school and
thousands of families struggling to find child care at the last second,
infuriated parents and the public.2 16 As in 1976, the strike finally ended
when the parties accepted a PERB panel proposal. The new contract
would retroactively cover 1999 through 2004 and include a 13.5% salary
increase, with retired teachers increasing contribution to their health
insurance.2 As with the 1976 strike, the fines and penalties imposed on
the BTF 2 18 created tension and resentment between the parties that
would last for years.
Since the 2000 contract expired in 2004, negotiations have
essentially been non-existent. In 2004, a state-appointed fiscal control
board imposed a salary freeze for all District employees, including
teachers.2 19 When the freeze lifted in 2007 the District moved all
teachers up one "step" on the salary schedule. 22 0 The Union was
outraged, contending that all teachers should be moved up three "steps"
to account for the entire three-year freeze period, and filed suit.2 2 1 What
followed was another four years of litigation; the Union won the first
214. Darryl Campagna, Strike Fund Buoys Agitated Teachers, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 30,
2000.
215. Darryl Campagna & Gene Warner, Strike Closes Schools; Teachers to be Told by Union
to Report, BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 8, 2000.
216. Darryl Campagna, Striking - A Tactic PastIts Time?; Few ParentsAre Home All Day to
Tend Strike-Idled Pupils, And Some; Observers Say The Job Action May Breed Ill Will, BUFFALO
NEWS, Sept. 10, 2000. Additionally, with the BTF made up largely of white teachers living beyond
the city limits and the families most impacted by the strike being largely low-income minorities, the
strikes became painfully tinged with racial undertones. See id
217. Editorial, Time to Concentrateon the Kids, BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 22, 2000.
218. BTF President Phillip Rumore was sentenced to 15 days in jail for contempt of court, of
which he served 8 days, despite pleas from prominent politicians across the region and state and
School Board members themselves. See Peter Simon, Rumore Off to Jail as Pleas Fail to Sway
Court, BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 30, 2000. The District pressed for $400,000 in fines and the Union
was ultimately fined $250,000. Peter Simon, Teachers Union Fined$250,000 for Strike, BUFFALO
NEWS, Dec. 5, 2000. Beyond these penalties, the District and Union cross-filed improper practice
charges with PERB, with the District seeking to revoke the Union's automatic dues check-off
privileges. Peter Simon, Educators on Edge: School District, Teachers Union Fighting A Cold
War, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 6, 2000.
MGT OF AMERICA, INC., ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY OF BUFFALO PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
219.

FINAL REPORT 3-38 (2010) [hereinafter MGT REPORT].
220. See id.
221. See id
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two rounds, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed and found for
the District.22 2 Again, the four years of litigation not only added
significant tension to the relationship between the District and the BTF,
but also prevented any negotiations for a new contract in the interim.22 3
In 2012, national attention fell on the District's contract with the
BTF as major news outlets picked up a local story covering the
explosive growth of a "cosmetic surgery" rider in the contract's health
coverage. 2 24 The rider, which provides zero co-pay cosmetic surgery
coverage as part of the teachers' health care coverage, was initially
inserted into the Union contract sometime in the 1970s, long before
elective cosmetic surgery became widespread and remained largely out
of sight for the next several decades.225 In the 2000s, however, the
District suddenly saw its payments under the rider more than triple in
just six years. News report after news report asked not why the rider
was included in the first place, but why the District was powerless to do
anything to control the exploding costs. 22 6 The reason why the District
had no control, as well as the reason why the Buffalo Teachers
Federation has gone nine years without a new contract in place, and why
the Union and the District have spent fifteen of the last twenty-three
years litigating salary issues, lies in the impact of the Taylor Law and the
Triborough Amendment on negotiations.
B. Buffalo's Budget Woes: Spiraling Costs with No ReliefForthcoming
Budget data over the past five years shows how Triborough has
locked in unsustainable labor costs and prohibited the Buffalo City
School District from addressing fiscal realities, especially when most
needed.227 The District's revenue grew from 2006 through 2009,
supported both by growth in state aid and by increased grant funding,

222. See id.; In re Meegan v. Brown, 16 N.Y.3d 395, 395 (N.Y. 2011).
223. See Meegan, 16 N.Y.3d at 402.
224. See, e.g., Jordan Weissmann, Why Does Buffalo Payfor Its Teachers to Have Plastic
Surgery?,
THE
ATLANTIC
ONLINE
(Jan.
18,
2012,
9:15
AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/01/why-does-buffalo-pay-for-its-teachers-tohave-plastic-surgery/251533/.
225. See id
226. See id.
227. All budget data is derived from official Buffalo City School District annual budgets and
four-year
budget
projections.
Finance,
BUFFALO
PUBL.
SCHS.,
http://buffaloschools.org/Finance.cfm?subpage-237 (last visited Dec. 28, 2013); See also, Jason A.
Zwara, Buffalo's Budget Woes: DistrictRevenues and Expenses, 2006-2012, BUFFALO REFORMED,
(Apr. 2013), http://www.buffaloreformed.com/files/6713/7882/6326/BuffalosBudgetWoes.pdf.
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primarily though federal Race to the Top funding in 2008 and 2009.228
From 2009 through 2012, the budget stabilized, briefly dropping in 2010
before returning to the same level in 2011 and 2012.229 In 2006, total
revenue for the District was $634.3 million; this spiked to $658.83
million in 2009, briefly dipped in 2010, then returned to $659.4 million
for 2012.230

While revenues peaked in 2009 before stabilizing through 2012, the
District's expenses have exploded over the same period. 231 Total
operating expenses in 2006-2007 were $587.3 million; expenditures
have steadily climbed each year, with 2012 projected expenditures
amounting to $676 million, a 15% increase over just five years. Over
that same period, revenue grew only 4%. Observed in a vacuum, it
would be unclear what was driving the budget gap-exploding costs, or
stagnant revenues. One major factor points out the true culprit. Over
the same period, enrollment in the District dropped by 4.2%.232 Yet
even with a significant decrease in student enrollment, both revenues
and expenses increased over the same period.233
The biggest expense for the District is labor expenses, which are a
direct result of collective bargaining agreements. From 2006 to 2012,
while student enrollment dropped around 5%, labor compensation in the
District dropped only .24%.234 While it is troubling enough that the
District's direct labor expenses have not kept pace with falling
enrollment, far worse are the exploding costs of providing benefits,
especially health insurance, to employees and retirees. Since 2006,

228. Grant funding typically is allocated and earmarked for specific programs, therefore could
best be thought of as outside the District's discretionary operations budget. This means that even if
the District sees a significant increase in grant funding, funds may not be available to cover
"operational" expenses, such as covering health insurance and retirement benefit expenses. See
Zwara, supranote 227.
229. See id
230. Budget data is on file with the author. The 2011 and 2012 budgets do, however, rely on
using $34.5 million and $19.5 million, respectively, in appropriation funds, e.g. "rainy day" funds.
231. All budget data used here excludes building-related revenue and expenses because the
District is in the midst of a major overhaul of nearly all of its facilities. Including building revenue
and expenses would dramatically skew the budget figures.
232. This is a conservative figure. The District projected increased enrollment in 2012-13,
anticipating the closure of a charter school, pushing many students back into the District. This
charter closure was delayed and now looks to not be forthcoming. Excluding this projected
increase, the true enrollment decline is 5.4%.
233. As a result, per student spending in the district has grown from $17,421 to $21,200, a
21.7% increase, in just five years.
234. District staffing has declined by 6.2%, driven primarily by decreases in teacher aides
(down 15.9%) and blue-collar workers, including bus aides, cafeteria staff, maintenance staff, etc.
(down 21%). Teaching staff has declined 3.1% while administrators have actually increased 2.8%.
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expenditures for employee and retiree benefits have increased 37.9%,
amounting to $172.2 million, or 25.3% of the District's total budget. 235
Health insurance has been the primary driver of this rising expense,
especially for retirees.236
While these rising expenses are the result of many different
variables, Triborough denies the District the flexibility needed to address
them and prevents a collaborative approach between the District and its
employees to tackle these tough issues, instead establishing an
adversarial relationship that allows and encourages the employee unions
to dig in and protect themselves when the District faces tough times.
V. HOW THE TAYLOR LAW INTERFERES WITH COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING - AND How IT CAN BE FIXED

The Taylor Law, specifically the Triborough Amendment and
section 209(3)(f), significantly interferes with collective bargaining,
particularly between school districts and their bargaining units. The
impact of the Taylor Law may be seen in the conflicts, delays, and
tensions arising out of contract negotiations in Buffalo over the past
thirty years.
First, by guaranteeing that all terms and conditions of a contract
remain in effect after its expiration, the Triborough Amendment removes
any meaning from the contract's expiration date and, with it, any
consequences resulting from allowing the contract to expire without a
new agreement in place. The Amendment creates two issues that
interfere with collective negotiations. First, without any consequences
resulting from the expiration of a contract, there is no urgency to
negotiate. Second, without a meaningful deadline pushing the parties
towards negotiations, outside, tangential issues between the parties can
easily push them apart. These issues may be seen in Buffalo's contract
negotiations with the BTF in 1990, 1994, and the ongoing nine-year
period without a contract.237 In 1990 and 1994 the ongoing back-pay
lawsuit interfered with negotiations for a new contract.238 Since 2004, a

235. For comparison, all other non-labor expenses for the District, including everything from
transportation and food services to text books and supplies, amounted to only $147.6 million in
2012, or 21.7% of the total budget.
236. Health insurance expenses for current employees rose from $34.1 million in 2006 to
$41.2 million from 2012, or 20.8%. Providing health insurance to retired employees has been vastly
more costly, rising from $40.3 million in 2006 to $63.8 million in 2012, a shocking 58.1% increase.
237. See Light, supra note 209.
238. See Scott & Linsky, supra note 162, at 30, 37.
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host of continuing conflicts separate and apart from the contract
negotiations have all allowed one party or the other to refuse to come to
the bargaining table, including the wage freeze of the mid-2000s, the
publicity surrounding the "cosmetic surgery rider" and, most recently,
the dispute over a new, state-mandated teacher evaluation system. 2 39
Because the Taylor Law fails to impose any consequences for allowing
the contract to expire, there is no incentive to rise above ongoing
separate disputes and no disincentive to ignore them.
Second, the Triborough Amendment's preservation of the terms
and conditions of the expired contract "shifts the goalposts" right from
the start for bargaining. Rather than the expiring contract serving as a
starting point for negotiations from which the parties can negotiate based
on the factors that have changed since the last negotiations (most notably
the public employer's fiscal situation), the Triborough Amendment
effectively makes the expiring contract the "floor" for negotiations. The
terms and conditions of any new contract cannot be less favorable to the
employees than the current contract, with Buffalo's negotiations in 1996
a perfect example. Even with the District's fiscal crisis well publicized
and a major factor in negotiations, the contract the Union agreed to
saved the District only $3.5 million of a recommended $20 million.240
The contract also ambitiously relied on an increase of state aid that never
came. Instead, state aid was reduced over the next few years.241
Third, the issues discussed above are compounded in school
districts and other education sector employers by Taylor Law section
209(3)(f), a clause that only applies where "the public employer is a
school district, a board of cooperative educational services, a community
college, the state university of New York, or the city university of New
239. Bryan Meyer, City Unions Say Surplus Should End Wage Freeze; Control Board Says
Such Talk is Premature,BUFFALO NEWS, December 10, 2005; see Weissmann, supra note 224; Jeff
Preval, Buffalo Teachers Union Plans to Reject Teacher Evaluations, WGRZ (Apr. 29, 2013, 10:47
AM),
http://www.wgrz.com/news/article/212299/37/Buffalo-Teachers-Union-Plans-to-RejectTeacher-Evaluations.
240. Heaney, supra note 208.
241. A secondary issue nested within this issue is the complexity salary schedules bring to
negotiations. In a typical contract, especially in public education, employees' base compensation is
calculated according to a "salary schedule," under which all, or nearly all, employees receive
guaranteed salary increases each year, based on years of service. These annual step increases are
considered to be separate from contractual "raises," and the bargaining unit regularly exploits the
blurred definitions when appealing for public pressure on the employer. This disparity helps
explain why the 2004 wage freeze imposed by a State-appointed control board was so dramatic. It
was a true freeze on all wages, preventing even step increases from being paid. Deidre Williams,
BTF Says Meditator'sProposalOn ContractFavors Buffalo School District,BUFFALO NEWS, Aug.
22, 2013, http://www.buffalonews.com/city-region/btf-says-mediators-proposal-on-contract-favorsbuffalo-school-district-20130822.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2013

33

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 5
226

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 31:193

York." 24 2 For these education sector employers, no binding arbitration
mechanism exists, unlike with other public sector employers.2 43 The
result is that the expiration date of a contract is truly meaningless.
Without consequences coming from the expiration and without a firm
arbitration resolution, public education contracts are essentially
perpetual, replaceable only by the joint agreement of both parties. Both
parties recognize this, and it is a major reason why contract negotiations
can drag on, as Buffalo's have for the past nine years. In a 2010
consultant report, representatives of the BTF "expressed the belief that
there is no purpose in [declaring impasse] since the dispute would go to
a Fact Finder. The Fact Finder's Report would then be submitted to the
School Board and to Union leadership. No purpose would be served
since the process lacks binding arbitration. ... 2 Without any finality
in arbitration, the entire process is meaningless, not to mention costly
and time consuming.
These issues stem from the Triborough Amendment's
reinforcement of a flawed presumption that, as unions and their
supporters regularly argue, the Triborough Amendment was enacted as a
compromise to account for the Taylor Law's ban on public employee
strikes.245 While the ban on strikes, in theory, tilts the balance of
negotiations in the employer's favor, this does not work quite the same
in practice, especially in the public sector. Many parts of the public
sector, such as education, medical services and public safety, are
especially concerned about strikes because of the level of unrest they can

cause. 246
The history of teacher strikes in Buffalo points to both how limited
the effectiveness of the strike prohibition is and how profound the
impact of even a mere threat to strike is on negotiations. The BTF has
gone on strike twice in the past forty years. The 1976 strike had a
decades-long impact on the District, while the effects of the 2000 strike

242. See N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 209(3)(f) (McKinney 2011 & Supp. 2013).
243. See id. For most public employers, the impasse and arbitration process ends with binding
legislative intervention. CIv. SERV. § 209(3)(e). For police, firefighters and related employees, the
arbitration process ends in binding interest arbitration. CIV. SERV. § 209(4).
244. MGT REPORT, supra note 219, at 3-38.
245. See, e.g., Richard E. Casagrande & Deborah A. Milham, Why We Defend Triborough,
NYsUT UNITED (Mar. 2011), http://www.nysut.org/news/nysut-united/issues/201 1/march201 1/why-we-defend-triborough.
246. Consider the Buffalo Teachers Federation 2000 strike, which quickly escalated to a
community-wide fight over the racial and socio-economic implications of the strike. See
Campagna, supra note 216.
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are still reverberating.24 7 In 1994, the BTF merely threatened to strike
when preparing a strike fund.2 48 This threat alone was enough to quickly
push the District to agree to an unfavorable contract. The Triborough
Amendment suffers from the fatal logical flaws that prohibiting strikes is
actually effective and that this imbalance in bargaining leverage needs to
be corrected.
A. "Preservingthe Status Quo"
Ultimately, the various collective bargaining issues created by the
Taylor Law are products of one fatal flaw in the reasoning supporting
the Amendment, namely, the distortion of what the status quo in
negotiations actually entails. The Amendment errs in seeking to
preserve the status quo before that term is adequately defined. As one
commentator stated, "[i]f the [Amendment] was intended to preserve the
status quo, the difficult question of defining the status quo remains

unanswered." 24 9
In the Triborough decision, PERB held "an employer cannot
unilaterally alter mandatory subjects of negotiations while a successor
agreement is being negotiated." 25 0 Far from being a conclusive
statement, however, the decision asked an important legal question: what
terms and conditions of a contract are "mandatory" and therefore must
be preserved after a contract's expiration to ensure a level playing field
in negotiating a successor agreement? Like many complex legal
questions, the definition of "mandatory" would require a gradual
process, shaping the edges through case-by-case determinations as
specific questions and circumstances came before PERB and the courts.
Over the next decade, PERB and the courts engaged in exactly this
process of shaping the contours of this complex question.2 5 1
The Triborough Amendment, enacted in 1982, preempted this
budding case law by declaring it an improper practice "to refuse to
continue all the terms of an expired agreement until a new agreement is

247. See Simon, supranote 218; see In re Meegan v. Brown, 16 N.Y.3d 395 (N.Y. 2011).
248. See Scott & Linsky, supranote 162, at 37.
249. McGuire, supra note 136, at 483-84.
250. Triborough Bridge and TunnelAuth. 5 P.E.R.B. 1 3037, 3065 (1972) (emphasis added).
251. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Poughkeepsie v. Poughkeepsie Pub. Sch. Teachers Ass'n., 349
N.Y.S.2d 47, 48-50 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973); Cardinale v. Anderson, 347 N.Y.S.2d 284, 289 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1973); Dobbs Ferry Union Free School Dist. v. Dobbs Ferry United Teachers, 395
N.Y.S.2d 988, 995 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); Bd. of Educ. Servs. of Rockland County v. N.Y. Pub.
Emp't Relations Bd., 41 N.Y.2d 753, 759 (N.Y. 1977).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2013

35

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

228

[Vol. 31:193

negotiated... ."252 The Triborough Amendment, therefore, overrides the
on-going legal discussion defining "mandatory" terms by declaring all
terms and conditions "mandatory," and thus protected, regardless of how
the preservation of such terms impacted the collective bargaining table.
While supporters of the Triborough Amendment frequently argue
that it merely codifies the Triborough doctrine,253 in reality the
amendment goes much further. "Whether it was inadvertent or not, the
reach of [Triborough] has extended far beyond the continuation of the
status quo-in exchange for the strike proscription--during negotiations
for a successor agreement."2 54 Rather, the Amendment took what was a
difficult question of subtle, case-by-case determinations of what terms
and conditions were "mandatory," needing to be preserved in order to
ensure fair negotiating, and which terms were "permissive," allowing the
employer flexibility to deal with pressing economic realities while a new
successor agreement was negotiated, and pushed it aside in favor of a
broad, protectionist definition of the status quo. In reality, it is
impossible for the Triborough Amendment to accomplish what its union
supporters claim, codifying the Triborough doctrine, simply because the
doctrine was still evolving and developing when the Triborough
Amendment was enacted.
By superseding the Triborough doctrine, the Amendment largely
ignores the doctrine's initial purpose.
By removing the distinction between mandatory and nonmandatory
subjects for contract continuation purposes, but continuing it for
negotiation and impasse resolution purposes, the artificial balance
undermines the collective bargaining process. Further, it creates a
material disincentive for the employer to include nonmandatory terms
in collective bargaining agreements because of the practical and lepal
inability to treat them as non-mandatory once the contract expires.25
Considering that the Taylor Law initially intended to promote
harmonious cooperation and flexibility in solving unique issues in public
employment, the Triborough Amendment essentially prohibits any sort
of experimentation or flexibility, lest an employer become perpetually
burdened with a failed experimental approach to employee relations.
In school districts, where the need for cooperation, flexibility, and

252.
253.
254.
255.

N.Y. CIv. SERv. LAW § 209-a(1)(e) (McKinney 2013 & Supp. 2013) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Casagrande & Milham, supra note 245.
See Moses, supranote 115, at 95.
Id. at 108.
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experimentation is especially high, the problems caused by the
Triborough Amendment are further compounded by the absence of
binding arbitration.2 5 6 In non-education public sectors, the impact of the
Triborough Amendment is somewhat tempered by the finality of binding
arbitration, provided in sections 209(3)(e) and 209(4).257 With binding
arbitration, the arbitration panel weighs both the employer and employee
proposals. The uncertainty of the outcome of arbitration, therefore,
provides some pressure on the parties to reach an agreement on their
own, lest the arbitration outcome be less favorable to their position.258
"The implications of the Triborough Doctrine are, therefore, extensive
since they alter the negotiating mechanism. Less incentive to reach
agreement may prolong the negotiating process, thus increasing pressure
on the employer to make concessions . . . .
In the education sector,
however, even this small amount of pressure to reach an agreement
voluntarily is absent.
At its heart, the Triborough Amendment is unconcerned with
codifying the Triborough doctrine. Rather, the Amendment's only
concern is guaranteeing protection of the union at the expense of the
employer and, ultimately, the public. Triborough "gives employees
unprecedented security during the interim between contracts . . . By
enacting [the Amendment], the Legislature has won this security for the
unions without negotiation, and thus artificially altered the negotiating
process." 26 0 In this way, the Triborough Amendment fundamentally
alters the collective bargaining process, tilting the balance in the
employee union's favor, and placing all the pressure in negotiations on
the employer to make concessions to strike a deal. As the history of
collective bargaining between the Buffalo City School District and the
BTF shows, the Amendment has had disastrous consequences, both on
the District's finances and its policies. The Taylor Law is in dire need of
reform.
B. Fixing the Taylor Law
The Taylor Law was initially enacted as a reaction to continued
labor strife that persisted despite the Condon-Wadlin ban on public

§ 209(3)(f)

256.

See N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW

257.

See Civ. SERV. § 209(3)(e); §209(4).

258.
259.
260.

See McGuire, supranote 136, at 466.
Id.
Id. at 492.
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employee strikes.2 61 Built on the idea that giving employees a voice in
establishing the terms and conditions of employment could prevent labor
strife, the Taylor Law adapted private sector collective bargaining
models to the public sector. In doing so, the Taylor Commission
recognized that the private sector models needed to be modified to
account for the factors and circumstances unique to the public sector,
notably that public sector employees were prohibited from striking.262
Yet, whether from overestimating the impact of the strike prohibition or
underestimating the impact of other factors unique to the public sector,
or simply because the political process of enactment and subsequent
amendments watered down the final act, the Taylor Law has become a
law protecting public employees at the expense of all other interests
involved in public sector labor relations, particularly the public's interest
in an efficient and financially sustainable government.
The impact of the Law is most evident in school districts, which are
subject to an additional and unique clause making fair bargaining even
more difficult. 263 As the example of the Buffalo Public Schools shows,
the Taylor Law creates an adversarial relationship between the public
employer and its bargaining units that no longer meets the needs of
today's public sector labor relations. Worse, however, are the
amendments to the Taylor Law, the Triborough Amendment and section
209(3)(f) particularly, which tip the scale of leverage dramatically in the
public employees' favor.264 Rather than responding and adjusting to the
public sector's current needs and crafting a flexible, collaborative labor
relationship, the Amendment digs in and protects unions and public
employees from modern realities.
In sum, the Taylor Law's initial framework, and the adversarial
relationship it creates, is outdated and ill-suited for public sector
collective bargaining that demands flexibility and collaboration between
employer and employee.26 5 Combined with the amendments enacted
over the years, the Law has promoted one goal, the protection of the
rights and benefits of public employees, at the expense of all other
interests and goals of public sector labor relations. The Taylor Law
needs to be reconsidered and amended to set it back on its intended
course, promoting labor harmony while also allowing for the efficient
Three legislative
and sustainable operation of the government.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

See Crotty, supra note 11.
DONOVAN, supra note 3, at 29-30.
N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209(3)(f) (McKinney 2011 & Supp. 2013).
See McMAHoN & TERRY, supra note 2, at 6-7.
DONOVAN, supra note 3, at 40.
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recommendations can begin this process.
1. Repeal the Triborough Amendment
The most important legislative action that can be taken is to repeal
section 209-a(1)(e), the Triborough Amendment, and restore the
Triborough line of cases, restoring the legal question first raised in the
Triborough case, and allowing the definition of "status quo" be
progressively developed on a case-by-case basis.
Repealing Triborough has received growing support from a diverse
range of interest groups, including municipal leaders, 2 66 school boards, 2 67
school superintendents, 26 8 and taxpayer reform groups. 2 69 These groups
tend to argue against one specific result of Triborough, the locking-in of
automatic salary-step increases, which means "a public employer's
salary costs continue to rise even when labor negotiations have reached
an impasse." 2 70 These groups were joined by a broader coalition in 2012
when news outlets across the country picked up stories covering the saga
of the BTF contract's "cosmetic surgery" rider.2 7 1 The "cosmetic
surgery" rider stories detailed how the Triborough Amendment
obstructed the District's ability to respond to out of control costs,
especially the costs of providing generous employee health insurance
packages.27 2
While these groups protest against specific outcomes from the
Triborough Amendment, these problems and others stem from a
common fault in the law. As the Atlantic Online article describes it,
"[c]ollective bargaining only works if both sides have an incentive to
deal." 273
The problem is that Triborough gives the employee
representative only one incentive to negotiate-if it can get a better deal
than the current contract. Thus, when a contract favorable to the union
266. See
e.g.,
The
Triborough
Amendment,
STOP
THE
TAX
SHIFT,
http://www.stopthetaxshift.org/employee-relations/25-triborough-amendment?format=pdf
(last
visited Sept. 28, 2013).
267. See
e.g.,
Triborough
Reform,
N.Y.S.
SCH.
BDS.
Ass'N,
http://www.nyssba.org/index.php?src-gendocs&ref=Triborough%20Reform&category=advocacy l
egislation (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
268. See e.g., Statewide Survey: NYS School Superintendents ForeseeFinancial/Educational
Insolvency, N.Y. COUNCIL OF SCH.
SUPERINTENDENTS
4
(Nov.
20,
2012),
http://www.nyscoss.org/img/news/newsgeivlf8xci.pdf.
269. See e.g., MCMAHON & TERRY, supra note 2, at 1, 13.
270. The TriboroughAmendment, supra note 266.
271. See Weissmann, supra note 224.
272. See id.
273. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2013

39

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

232

[Vol. 31:193

is agreed to in strong economic times, there is no incentive for the union
to negotiate a successor agreement when the initial contract expires and
the public employer's fortunes have worsened. Rather, the union is
content to maintain the terms of the expired contract until the employer
is able to offer more favorable terms. In sum, under Triborough, the
expiration of a contract means nothing.
Repealing the Triborough Amendment and restoring the
Triborough case law will restore the important legal question first posed
in Triborough that remains unresolved: what terms and conditions of
employment must be preserved after the expiration of a contract to
ensure fair bargaining over a successor agreement for both parties? The
courts and PERB began the long and difficult task of defining the
contours of the "status quo" that must be preserved during negotiations.
The Triborough Amendment preempted the development of this vital
legal doctrine in favor of a simplistic and protectionist answer, that
everything in the expired contract, including lock-step salary increases,
must be preserved in order to protect the employee.274 Repealing the
Triborough Amendment will allow the development of the Triborough
doctrine to return to its proper course, deciding the contours of the
doctrine on a case-by-case basis.
Beyond these issues, repealing the Triborough Amendment will
begin to restore managerial discretion back to public employers,
especially school districts, who have seen their autonomy stripped
through collective bargaining agreements that have gradually consumed
and defined operational decisions, from class sizes to curriculum and
teacher assignments. As the authority to delineate "mandatory" and
"permissive" subjects of bargaining is restored to PERB and the courts,
public employers will gradually regain greater autonomy and flexibility
to adjust "permissive" subjects without requiring negotiations with the
bargaining unit.
Repealing the Triborough Amendment is thus vital both in assisting
public employers to address their dire financial situations and in
restoring the autonomy public employers require to operate effectively
and efficiently. Repealing the Triborough Amendment should be a top
priority.
2. Adjust Strike Penalties
The prohibition on strikes by public employees has been at the core
274.

See discussion supraPart V.A.
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of public sector labor relations since long before the Condon-Wadlin
Act, which codified the common law ban on public employee strikes. 275
The Taylor Commission took the continuation of the strike ban as a
276
while the Commission's report expounded the arguments
given,
supporting the ban.277 The question that has persisted, however, is what
penalties are appropriate and effective to enforce the ban on strikes. The
Condon-Wadlin Act failed, in part, because the penalties it imposed to
enforce the ban on strikes were unenforceable in practice.278
When the Taylor Commission first convened, one of its five
priorities was to determine what penalties worked best to enforce the
ban. 2 79 The penalties proposed by the Taylor Commission were less
harsh than those under Condon-Wadlin, yet still significant. Throughout
the political process of compromising to enact the bill, however, these
penalties were watered down.
A year later, when the Taylor
Commission was reconvened, restoration of the penalties initially
proposed was one of the Commission's four recommendations for
amending the Act. 2 80 The 1969 amendments to the Taylor Law enacted
these recommendations by removing the ceiling on fines that could be
imposed on the union and permitting the revocation of the union's
automatic dues check-off rights. However, the amendments also went
much further by adding additional penalties directed at individual
striking employees.2 8'
275. See DONOVAN, supranote 3, at 3; Crotty, supra note 11.
276. "For the committee. .. the issue quickly became a nonissue as there was almost instant
agreement among its members that strikes in public employment were clearly inappropriate."
DONOVAN, supranote 3, at 29.
277. The Commission laid out two reasons for the prohibition:
The first was the familiar argument that the marketplace constraints that customarily
play a disciplining role in private industry bargaining are either wholly absent or
severely attenuated in the government setting. A second and equally fundamental
reason ... related to ideas about governance in a democratic society. The claim is made
that a strike in the public sector is essentially a contest of relative political power and as
such is in conflict with the orderly functioning of democratic political processes,
whereby elected officials exercise executive and legislative authority on behalf of the
electorate.
Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
278. The New York City transit strike of 1965 which ostensibly led to the Taylor Commission
was a perfect example. As a condition of ending the strike, State legislature passed an "amnesty"
bill forgoing all penalties Condon-Wadlin would impose. See id. at 19-20, 23.
279. See id at 29.
280. Id. at 114-15.
281. Id. at 121-22. The Amendment added a "two for one" penalty, fining striking employees
two days' pay for each day on strike. The Amendment also made it more difficult to forego these
penalties at the end of the strike by requiring automatic deduction of the fines from employees'
paychecks. The "two for one" fines drew particular ire from employees, especially because they
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While the 1969 amendments to the Taylor Law adopted the
Commission's recommendations, they also needlessly added additional
penalties not recommended by the Commission. Overly harsh penalties
are just as obstructive to effective enforcement as overly lenient
penalties. The Taylor Law's strike prohibition penalties need to be
amended and realigned with the Taylor Commission's
recommendations. This includes repealing the "two for one" fine on
striking employees while also strengthening the penalties imposed
directly on the union, including mandatory revocation of the union's
automatic dues check-off right. While the "two for one" penalty
directed at individual striking employees was ostensibly intended to
address "wildcat" strikes,282 the penalties have also been imposed on
employees of union-sanctioned strikes while the union goes relatively
unpunished. Moreover, the "two for one" penalty outside of the
"wildcat" strike context serves only to foster resentment and to reinforce
the adversarial nature of the employer-employee relationship.
The Taylor Commission's recommendations were properly aligned
to walk the delicate line. The enacted law and subsequent amendments,
however, have drifted too far and have thrown off the perfect balance of
the Commission's recommendations.
3. Repeal Section 209(3)(f)
Lastly, section 209(3)(f), an oft overlooked clause of the Taylor
Law, has an outsized impact on public sector labor relations in the
education sector, particularly in school districts, which compounds the
problems caused by the Triborough Amendment. Added to the Taylor
Law in 1974, two years after the Triborough Amendment, section
209(3)(f) applies only "where the public employer is a school district, a
board of cooperative educational services, a community college," or a
state or city university. 283 The section eliminates finality in collective
bargaining impasses by excusing education sector negotiations from
binding arbitration or legislative finality. As a result, even if education
sector negotiations reach impasse,284 intervention by PERB will not
amounted to a source of revenue for the employer, which, as in the case of Buffalo following the
1990 teachers' strike, used the fine revenue to fund negotiated salary increases. See id.
282. "Wildcat" strikes are strikes by small groups of employees not authorized by the
employees' union. See Thomas Kevin Sheehy, Note, Wildcat Strikes: The Affirmative Duty of the
ParentUnion to Intervene, 9 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1059, 1059-60 (1980).
283. See N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209(3)(f) (McKinney 2011 & Supp. 2013).
284. The declaration of an "impasse" is a formal procedure which permits PERB to intervene
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produce any results. As a BTF representative explained in a 2010
consultant report, "there is no purpose in [declaring impasse] since the
dispute would go to a Fact Finder. The Fact Finder's Report would then
be submitted to the School Board and to Union leadership. No purpose
would be served since the process lacks binding arbitration. ... 285
In all other public sectors, contract negotiations are subject to one
of two forms of finality. In "emergency service" sectors, including
police and firefighters, section 209(4) subjects the parties to binding
interest arbitration after negotiations reach impasse.28 6 In all other
public sectors, section 209(3) establishes impasse procedures,
culminating in a legislatively imposed agreement, as required by section
209(3)(e).2 87 In education sectors, however, impasse and arbitration
provide no guarantee of final resolution. Only under such a system
could the Buffalo Teachers Federation, the Buffalo Public School
District's largest bargaining unit, go without a current contract for more
than nine years.288
Section 209(3)(f) has the effect of compounding the problems
caused by the Triborough Amendment. While Triborough gives public
employees a reason not to want to come to the bargaining table, section
209(3)(f) ensures the union does not have to come to the table either.
Thus, collective bargaining in the education sector is subject to the
union's veto. If the union is content with, or believes the public
employer cannot improve upon, the current agreement, the union has no
incentive, and cannot be compelled, to bargain a successor agreement.
This is the case that has plagued Buffalo for nearly a decade. The BTF
is well aware that the District does not have the financial capability to
improve upon the expired contract. Therefore the union has no incentive
to negotiate a replacement agreement.
The impact of section 209(3)(f) is particularly troublesome in light
of the two Taylor Commission reports, both of which stressed the
importance of finality in bargaining impasse to the public sector
collective bargaining scheme.289 In the second report, the Commission
stated, "to have an effective substitute for the strike there needed to be
finality in the impasse procedure and that any final judgment must

in the dispute. One of the parties involved in negotiations must declare the impasse and show why
negotiations cannot move forward. See CIv. SERV. § 209(2).
285. MGT REPORT, supranote 219, at 3-38.
286. See CV. SERV. §209(2).
287. See id. § 209(2).
288. See MGT REPORT, supranote 219, at 3-38.
289. See DONOVAN, supra note 3, at 38-9, 113.
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necessarily reside with the legislative body." 2 90 Because the collective
bargaining process is so vital to the budgetary process, which is
exclusively the domain of the legislative body, the legislature needed to
retain the ultimate say in the public employer's greatest expense, its
labor contracts.
Section 209(3)(f) must be repealed and legislative oversight
returned to collective bargaining in the education sector.
More
practically, the repeal of section 209(3)(f) will restore some meaning to
the expiration date of education sector contracts. It will compel both
sides to enter into negotiations, regardless of the impact of Triborough,
over concern that a legislatively approved agreement will be less
favorable than one normal negotiations would produce. The repeal of
section 209(3)(f) is vital to restoring fairness to collective bargaining in
the education sector.

290.

Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
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